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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to introduce a novel family of games related to congested 
networks. Traffic routing has been extensively analyzed from the non-cooperative aspect.  
A common assumption is that each individual optimizes his route in the network selfishly. 
However looking at the same network from a different scope in some cases we can find 
some actors that are responsible for the majority part of the traffic. From the point of view 
of these actors cooperation is indeed an inherent possibility of the game. Sharing 
information and cooperation with other agents may result in cost savings, and more 
efficient utilization of network capacities. Depending on the goal and employed strategy of 
the agents many possible cooperative games can arise. Our aim is to introduce and analyze 
these wide variety of transferable utility (TU) games. Since the formation of a coalition may 
affect other players costs via the implied flow and the resulting edge load changes in the 
network, externalities may arise, thus the underlying games are given in partition function 
form. 
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Forgalomirányítási oligopóliumok 
 
Csercsik Dávid - Sziklai Balázs  
 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
Tanulmányunkban egy új játékosztályt vezetünk be a forgalomirányítási hálózatokon.  
A forgalomirányítási problémákat legtöbbször nem-kooperatív szemszögből vizsgálják. 
Általános feltevés, hogy minden részvevő önző módon optimalizálja az útvonalát a 
hálózaton. 
Ugyanakkor más szemléletet követve olyan szereplőket is azonosíthatunk, akik a forgalom 
jelentős hányadáért felelősek. Az ilyen szereplők számára a kooperáció valódi lehetőségként 
jelentkezik. Az információ megosztása és a forgalom összehangolása költségmegtakarítást és 
a hálózati kapacitások hatékonyabb kihasználását eredményezheti. A részvevők céljától és 
alkalmazott stratégiájától függően többféle kooperatív játékot is definiálhatunk ilyen 
módon. A célunk ezeknek az átruházható hasznosságú (TU) játékoknak az elemzése. Mivel 
egy koalíció megalakulása hatással van a többi játékos költségeire az útvonalak megváltozott 
terhelése miatt, externáliák léphetnek fel. A játékot így partíciós függvény formában írjuk 
fel. 
 
Tárgyszavak: kooperatív játékelmélet, partíciós függvény formájú játék, 
forgalomirányítás, externáliák 
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1 Introdution
Problems onerning ongested networks originate traditionally from the
eld of engineering (Altman, Boulognea, El-Azouzi, Jimenez, and L.Wynter,
2006). Probably this is the reason why non-ooperative approah is more
wide-spread among the researhers of the subjet
1
. The rst general model is
due to Wardrop (1952). In this model the network is represented by a graph,
while routing tasks are assigned to a subset of nodes and lateny funtions
are dened on the edges. Furthermore it is assumed that the tra an be
divided into innitesimally small parts whih therefore an be represented
as ows in the graph. The objetive of these innitesimally small piees or
individuals is to minimize the experiened lateny.
Many equilibrium notions were introdued to analyze suh ongested net-
works (for a omprehensive study see Roughgarden (2005, 2006)). Most of
the literature fouses on Nash-equilibria and a related onept the so-alled
Prie of Anarhy (Feldmann, Gairing, Luking, Monien, and Rode, 2003).
In a ongested network Nash-equilibrium (NE) is reahed when no individ-
ual an obtain a lower lateny by unilaterally hanging his route. In general,
suh a NE need not be unique. The Prie of Anarhy is the ratio of the soial
ost of the worst and best NE-point. The notion was introdued by Koutsou-
pias and Papadimitriou (2009) and quikly beame popular as it suessfully
aptures the possible suboptimality of NE-points. To resolve suh situations
Stakelberg routing was introdued (Korilis, Lazar, and Orda, 1997) in whih
model a ertain ratio of all users are obeying to a entral authority whose
objetive is to drive the tra toward an equilibrium point with lower soial
ost. In partiular there are two types of players a so-alled leader and fol-
lowers. The goal is to nd a strategy for the leader that fores the followers
to reat in a way that minimizes the total lateny in the system. For more
on this topi see (Karakostas and Kolliopoulos, 2009).
A possible logial extension of the above model is to onsider more than
one leader. In other words there are a few distinguished players that al-
together are responsible for the whole tra in the network. The original
Wardrop model is inherently non-ooperative, while a setup where all the
players are "leaders" is essentially ooperative. The objetive of eah player
is to route his tra with minimal ost. Furthermore it an be assumed that
ooperating players determine their routes by joint design to minimize their
overall ost. The values of the oalitions are dened as the improvement om-
pared to the referene ase, when no ooperation appears. As some oalitions
1
Although the ooperative (non-TU) approah is also often used in the ase of wireless
ommuniation networks (Khandani, J.Abounadi, E.Modiano, and L.Zheng, 2007)
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form, routing paths may alter due to the joint optimization proess, whih
may in turn aet the osts of other players via the modied edge latenies.
Sine suh externalities may happen the game is given in partition funtion
form (Thrall and Luas, 1963).
A senario where multiple navigation systems are routing their lients on
the same tra network an be onsidered as a possible appliation of the
dened game theoreti model framework. Novel teleommuniation systems
may mean an other potential appliation eld of the proposed approah (Alt-
man, Boulognea, El-Azouzi, Jimenez, and L.Wynter, 2006; Khandani, Modi-
ano, Abounadi, and Zheng, 2005; Khandani, J.Abounadi, E.Modiano, and
L.Zheng, 2007; Devroye, Vu, and Tarokh, 2008)
The struture of the paper is as follows. In setion 2 we introdue the
notation used, dene the partition funtion form ooperative game on the
routing network and summarize the onsidered routing strategies. The main
results are disussed in setion 3, where we show that the sequene of iterative
preditive strategies of inreasing order may onverge to routing ongura-
tion, whih is a Nash equilibrium (NE), but this onvergene is not always
neessary even if a unique NE exists. Furthermore, we and analyze the
superadditivity and stability properties of the game, and via the reursive
ore onept we show total ooperation may not be always beneial for the
players.
2 Materials and methods
2.1 Denition of the game
In this setion we dene delivery games and introdue the tra routing and
game theoreti framework that is needed to analyze suh games. We made
an eort to keep the notational traditions of both disiple. To make it more
legible we employ the standard that the upper index always refers to some
player or a oalition and in ase of ows the lower index is always some edge
or a path.
First let us reall some basi notions of ooperative games. A ooperative
game with transferable utility or simply a TU-game is an ordered pair (N, v)
onsisting of the player set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and a harateristi funtion v :
2N → R with v(∅) = 0. The value v(S) is regarded as the worth of oalition
S. The members of S an ahieve this value by ooperating regardless of
how players outside the oalition reat. In a partition funtion form (PFF)
game v(S) depends also on the partition to where S belongs (Thrall and
Luas, 1963). Formally a partition funtion form game is a pair (N, V ) where
3
V : π → (2N → R) is the partition funtion whih assigns harateristi
funtions (v) to eah partition π ∈ Π(N) (where Π(N) denotes the set of
partitions of N). For S ∈ π, the worth of V (S, π) denotes the amount that
the players in S an guarantee themselves by ooperating, when the oalition
S is embedded in the partition π.
Furthermore we all the pair ω = (x, π) an outome, where π ∈ Π(N) is
a partition and x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ RN is a payo vetor satisfying feasibility;∑
i∈(S∈pi) x
i ≥ V (S, π) for all S ∈ π. Let us denote the the set of outomes
in (N, V ) by Ω(N, V ).
Next we dene the delivery game, and show how the value of a ertain
oalition S embedded in a partition π an be alulated.
Denition 1 A delivery game D = (N,Γ,∆, σ) is a 4-tuple onsisting of a
player set N , a network Γ, a set of delivery tasks ∆ and a routing strategy σ.
A network Γ is a two-tuple (G, l), represented by a direted graph G(V,E),
and a set of edge lateny funtions l = {le|e ∈ E}. A delivery task τ =
(r, s, t) ∈ R+ × V × V is desribed by a quantity and two nodes (a soure
and sink respetively). To eah player j ∈ N kj delivery tasks are assigned
τ j = ∪k
j
i=1{(r
j
i , s
j
i , t
j
i )}.
Aording to an atual strategy σ ∈ Σ (where Σ is the set of all the
possible pure routing strategies) all players determine the route for their
delivery for eah of their tasks. Cooperating players determine their delivery
routes by joint design in order to minimize their overall ost, taking into
aount the loads on the edges generated by the deliveries of all players
partiipating in the oalition. The set of all distint paths from sji to t
j
i
is denoted by Pji . Then P
j def= ∪k
j
i=1P
j
i and P
def
= ∪j∈N
(
Pj
)
. Therefore P
ontains all the possible routes between soures and sinks. A tra ow is a
funtion f : P → R≥0. The ow of player j on edge e is f
j
e =
∑
P∈Pj :e∈P fP ,
while the ow of oalition S on edge e is fSe =
∑
j∈S f
j
e (for onveniene
sake instead of fNe we write shortly fe). We denote by f
S
the set of ows
of oalition S, formally fS = {fP : P ∈ P
j
for some j ∈ S}. We say that
fS is a feasible solution for oalition S i
∑
P∈Pji
fP = r
j
i for all j ∈ S and
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , kj}. The set of feasible solutions is denoted by F. The load
of edge e with respet to agent j is the tra that goes through the edge
not ounting f je . We denote this by λ
j
e, formally λ
j
e =
∑
k 6=j f
k
e = fe − f
j
e .
Similarly λSe =
∑
k/∈S f
k
e = fe− f
S
e . The expeted load of edge e with respet
to oalition S is the ow that goes through e not ounting fSe aording to
the urrent knowledge of S (whih depends on the oalition struture and
σ). We denote this by λ̂Se .
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It is ommonly aepted to make some onstrains on the lateny funtion,
suh as non-negativity, dierentiability and non-dereasingness. We will only
assume non-negativity thus le : R≥0 → R≥0.
The dierene between a delivery game and the analogue non-ooperative
routing problem is that players are allowed to form oalitions. Tehnially a
oalition is treated as a new player who inherits the delivery tasks from its
members. The expeted ost of a oalition S is
cexp(D,pi)(S) =
∑
e∈E
le(λ̂
S
e + f
S
e ) · f
S
e . (1)
Note that the value of (1) depends on the routing strategy the players
use and the partition π embedding S. The resulting ost of the oalition S
related to D(N,Γ,∆, σ) is
c(D,pi)(S) =
∑
e∈E
le(fe) · f
S
e (2)
where fe is determined by omputing argminfS∈F c
exp
(D,pi)(S) for every S ∈ π.
In other words eah oalition in a given partition determines its routing
by assessing how muh tra will appear on ertain edges of the network.
However the atual ost c(D,pi)(S) indued this way an be quite dierent
than the expeted ost.
The harateristi funtions, based on the ost of a oalition are dened
then as follows. The value of a oalition S in a partition π is
v(D,pi)(S) =
∑
j∈S
c(D,pi0)(j)− c(D,pi)(S) (3)
where π0 is the referene, all singleton partition. In other words, the value of
a oalition in a ertain partition is the dierene between the total routing
ost of its partiipants and the overall ost of its members in the all singleton
partition. We will see that the players do not always benet by forming a
oalition, as a result v an be negative.
Finally the partition funtion related to the delivery game D is the fun-
tion VD(π) that assigns to eah partition π ∈ Π(N) the harateristi funtion
v(D,pi)(S). To simplify the notation, we omit the lower index (D,pi) in the ase
of the ost, expeted ost and harateristi funtions from now on.
2.2 Routing strategies
Players and oalitions may route their delivery aording to dierent possible
strategies. These are shortly desribed below, and demonstrated in setion
5
3. The expression 'routing strategy' is interpreted in a wide sense, inluding
information and beliefs about other players. The zero order strategy assumes
that the players have no information about eah other while in other ases
the delivery tasks are ommon knowledge. The strategies presented here are
pure in the sense that players may route their deliveries in several dierent
paths in the same time but they do it with probability 1.
2.2.1 Zero order strategy
This "dummy" strategy assumes that all oalitions neglet the ativity of
others, and route their deliveries in a way, whih is optimal when no other
tra appears on the network. This strategy assumes that non-ooperating
players/oalitions have no information of eah others routing tasks. In other
words λ̂Se = 0 for eah edge e ∈ E and for eah oalition S ∈ N .
2.2.2 First order preditive (FOPS) and n-th order preditive
(nOPS) strategy
We dene the rst order preditive strategy as follows. Every oalition ex-
pets the remaining oalitions to route their deliveries aording to the zero
order strategy, and minimizes his routing osts aording to this. This strat-
egy assumes that the oalitions are aware of the other partiipants delivery
ontrats.
Formally, let us denote the resulting ow of edge e in the zero order
routing by fe(σ0). In this ase λ̂
S
e = fe(σ0) − f
S
e (σ0). In the seond order
preditive strategy all oalitions assume that the remaining ones will route
their delivery aording to the FOPS et.
2.2.3 Routing under Nash-equilibrium
Let A be an algorithm that omputes a NE for a given routing problem
(N,Γ,∆). Furthermore let σ(A) be the routing strategy that routes the
delivery tasks as in the NE omputed by A. Then D(N,Γ,∆, σ(A)) is a
delivery game. The equilibrium strategy of oalition S is denoted by sSσ(A).
Note that the strategy of S is naturally equivalent to the set of ows of S,
namely fS.
3 Results
In this setion we demonstrate the various possibly arising properties of the
dened game on various networks and examples.
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3.1 Basi properties of preditive strategies
The preditive tehnique is an elemental way to strategially approah a game
theoretial problem. The most diult part is to guess the depth of reasoning
of the other players. A fair assumption is that the players think that they
go at least one step further than the others. Here we only analyzed the ase
when the depth of reasoning is the same for all players and oalitions, and
every ator thinks that the other players take one step less in the reasoning
proess. Now we state a straightforward but important result.
Theorem 2 Let D be a delivery game, π = {S1, S2, . . . , Sk} a partition of N
and let sσn = (f
S1(σn), f
S2(σn) . . . , f
Sk(σn)) denote the n-th order preditive
strategy. If sσn+1 = sσn then sσm = sσn for all m > n furthermore the
resulting routing will be a Nash-equilibrium.
Proof: A routing strategy s˜ = (f˜S1, f˜S2, . . . , f˜Sk) is a NE if for all S ∈ π
argmin
fS∈F
c(D,pi)(S) = argmin
fS∈F
∑
e∈E
le(λ˜e + f
S
e ) · f
S
e = f˜
S.
If the n-th and the n+1-th order preditive strategies oinide, it means
that fS(σn) = f
S(σn+1) for all S ∈ π, thus the expeted and atual load of
any edge e is the same. Formally
λ̂Se (σn) =
∑
T∈pi,T 6=S
fTe (σn) =
∑
T∈pi,T 6=S
fTe (σn+1) = λ̂
S
e (σn+1).
It follows that sσm = sσn for all m > n. By the denition of the hara-
teristi funtion
argmin
fS∈F
cσn+1(S) = argmin
fS∈F
∑
e∈E
le(λ̂
S
e (σn+1) + f
S
e )f
S
e =
argmin
fS∈F
∑
e∈E
le(λ̂
S
e (σn) + f
S
e )f
S
e = argmin
fS∈F
cexpσn+1(S) = f
S(σn+1).
for all S ∈ π, hene it is indeed a NE.
We an obtain a useful orollary of Theorem 2 by reinterpreting the play-
ers strategy. We an think of fS as a |P| dimensional vetor. The oordinates
of fS orresponds to the ows of the distint paths between the soures and
sinks. In this way it is meaningful to speak about the pointwise onvergene
of fS.
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Corollary 3.1 Let D be a delivery game with ontinuous lateny funtions.
If limn→∞ sσn = (f˜
S1 , f˜S2, . . . , f˜Sk) = s˜ where f˜Si ∈ RP for i = 1, 2, . . . , k
then s˜ is a NE.
In other words if the ows of inreasing order preditive strategies are
onvergent, they onverge to a NE point.
3.2 Externalities and the onvergene of nOPS to NE
Let us onsider network 1 depited in Fig. 1. We take into aount 3 players
in order to be able to demonstrate the appearing externalities in the game.
In this simple example all players have one delivery task, and the nodes
orresponding to the sinks and soures are disjoint.
a
b
1
d
1
e
0.5+x
c
x
1
f
1
3
6
 (3)
(3)
(6)
x
3
a
b
d
e
c f
x2
x3
3-x2-x3
6-x1
6
x1
Figure 1: The basi struture of the network 1, and the possible routing alter-
natives of the players. The numbers with and without parentheses quantify
sinks and soures respetively. Player 2 an route his delivery of 6 units
via two ways (the distribution among the two optional paths is desribed
by x1), while player 3 an route his delivery of 6 units via three ways (the
distribution among the three optional paths is desribed by x2 and x3)
Let us suppose the following delivery tasks: τ 1 = (3, a, d), τ 2 = (6, b, f),
τ 3 = (3, c, e). Player one has no hoie (|P1| = 1), player 2 has two possible
options (|P1| = 2), and thus has one deision variable x1, whih desribes the
proportion regarding the distribution of his delivery among the two available
paths. Player 3 has 3 available paths (|P3| = 3), thus he has two deision
variables (x2 and x3).
8
The detailed alulations of this example an be found in Appendix A.
The resulting partition funtion in the ase of zero order strategy is summa-
rized in Table 1.
partition (π) values of oalitions (v(S))
{1},{2},{3} 0,0,0
{1,2},{3} 2.625, -0.75
{1,3},{2} 1.8437, 0.1875
{1},{2,3} 0.75, 7.125
{1,2,3} 12.375
Table 1: The resulting partition funtion of network 1 in the ase zero order
strategy.
Table 1 learly demonstrates the emergene of both positive and negative
externalities in the ase of zero order strategy. As oalitions {1} and {2}
merge, it implies a negative externality on player 3, while in ontrast the
merging of oalitions {1} and {3} or {2} and {3} is beneial for the player
not inluded in the ooperation (player 2 and 1 respetively).
3.2.1 The onvergene of nOPS to Nash Equilibrium
After the alulation of the FOPS, we are able to analyze the higher order
strategies in the ase of various oalition strutures. Tables 2 and 3 summa-
rizes, how the resulting routing variables, and ost of the oalitions hange,
while onseutively applying higher order strategies.
Partition {1}, {2}, {3} {1, 2},{3} {1, 3},{2}
Strategy
Zero order
1 (FOPS)
2
3
4
5
x1 x2 x3
3.5 1.5 1.25
4 2.5 0.5
4.13 2.63 0.38
4.16 2.66 0.34
4.16 2.66 0.34
4.17 2.67 0.33
x1 x2 x3
4.25 1.5 1.25
4.75 2.5 0.5
4.86 2.81 0.19
4.95 2.84 0.16
4.96 2.86 0.14
4.96 2.67 0.33
x1 x2 x3
4 1.63 1.38
4 2.5 0.5
4.13 2.63 0.38
4.16 2.66 0.34
4.16 2.66 0.34
4.17 2.67 0.33
Table 2: The evolution of routing variables [x1, x2, x3] of network 1 towards
NEs as the order of strategies inreased.
Let us note that the resulting NE oinides in the ase of the all-singleton
partiton and {1, 3}{2}.
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Partition {1}, {2}, {3} {1, 2},{3} {1, 3},{2}
Strategy
Zero order
1 (FOPS)
2
3
4
5
c1 c2 c3
17.25 42 12.62
15 38 10.25
14.63 37.45 10.27
14.53 37.32 10.27
14.51 37.29 10.28
14.5 37.28 10.28
c{1,2} c3
56.63 13.38
51.5 10.63
49.93 10.45
49.78 10.46
49.68 10.46
49.6 10.46
c{1,3} c2
28.03 41.81
25.25 38
24.9 37.45
24.8 37.32
24.79 37.29
24.78 37.28
Table 3: The evolution of resulting osts of the oalitions in network 1 towards
NEs as the order of strategies inreased.
The partition {1}, {2}, {3} pratially reahes NE in the 5th iteration
(ε < 10−4), while partitions {1, 2}, {3} and {1, 3}, {2} reah it around the
7th. The partition {1}, {2, 3} is not of interest, beause player 1 has no
deision variables, in this ase all nOPS with n>1 will be the same as the
FOPS. The routing in the ase of the grand oalition is the same in all ases
(onsider eg. π = {1, 2, 3}) assuming zero order strategy.
As we sill see in the next setion 3.3, the FOPS, SOPS, nOPS sequene
of strategies is not neessary onvergent. Furthermore, as we will show, a
NE may exist in a game with divergent nOPS.
3.3 Divergent nOPS
In this setion we demonstrate on the widely used Pigou network (Pigou,
1920) that the sequene of the inreasing order strategies is not neessary
onvergent even if a unique NE exists in the game.
3.3.1 Routing under Nash-equilibrium on Pigou's graph
Let ΓP be the well-known example of Pigou i.e. a graph with two parallel
edges (u and w) onneting two nodes (s and t). On the so alled upper
edge u the lateny is onstant 1, on the lower edge w the lateny is propor-
tional to the tra (see Fig. 2). Furthermore let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the
set of players with delivery tasks τ j = (rj, s, t) i.e. player j has to route
rj amount of tra from s to t. Let A be an algorithm that omputes a
Nash-equilibrium in ΓP and let σ(A) be the orresponding routing strategy.
Therefore D(ΓP , N,∆, σ(A)) is a well dened delivery game.
Note, that the lateny ost of player j is
c(j) = rj − f jw + f
j
w · fw = r
j + (λjw − 1) · f
j
w + (f
j
w)
2
10
s t
1
x
Figure 2: Network 2: Pigou's graph.
As rj is onstant c(j) is uniquely determined by how muh the players
route on the lower edge. Note that σ(A) = (f 1w, f
2
w, . . . , f
n
w) is a NE point if
no player j ∈ N an obtain smaller lateny ost by altering his strategy.
Theorem 3 If rj ≥ 1
n+1
for any player j ∈ N , where n = |N | then there is a
unique Nash-equilibrium point in D(ΓP , N,∆, σ(A)), namely where fw =
k
k+1
and fSw =
1
k+1
for any S ∈ π, where k = |π|.
Proof: It is enough to prove for the singleton partition. For other partitions
the theorem follows from the fat that eah oalition an be onsidered as a
separate player and if rj ≥ 1
n+1
for all j ∈ N then rS =
∑
j∈S r
j ≥ 1
n+1
for
all S ∈ π.
Suppose players follow the same strategy. Then eah player j ∈ N routes
rj − x amount of tra on the upper and x amount on the lower edge.
This is a Nash-equilibrium point if for any real number δ ∈ R, suh that
0 ≤ x + δ ≤ rj , if player j routes δ amount of tra in a dierent way, his
individual ost is inreasing. Formally
rj − (x+ δ) + (x+ δ)(n · x+ δ) ≥ rj − x+ (x)(n · x).
We an rewrite the above ondition as follows.
δ2 + δ · x · (n+ 1)− δ ≥ 0
Whih yields
1− |δ|
n+ 1
≤ x ≤
1 + |δ|
n+ 1
for any real number δ. We an onlude that x = 1
n+1
is a Nash-equlibrium
strategy for any number of player n.
Now we prove that this is a unique NE point. First suppose that fw <
n
n+1
.
In partiular let fw =
n
n+1
− ǫ1. Then there exists j suh that f
j
w =
1
n+1
− ǫ2
where ǫ2 along with ǫ1 are some positive real numbers. Let m
def
= min(ǫ1, ǫ2).
Now inreasing f jw by m dereases c(j).
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rj − (f jw +m) + (f
j
w +m) · (fw +m) ≤ r
j − f jw + f
j
w · fw (4)
Whih is equivalent to
(f jw +m) · (fw +m− 1) ≤ f
j
w · (fw − 1).
For instane if m = ǫ2
( 1
n+ 1
− ǫ2 +m
)
·
( n
n+ 1
− ǫ1 +m− 1
)
≤
( 1
n + 1
− ǫ2
)
·
( n
n+ 1
− ǫ1 − 1
)
( 1
n + 1
)
·
( n
n + 1
− ǫ1 + ǫ2 − 1
)
≤
( 1
n + 1
− ǫ2
)
·
( n
n+ 1
− ǫ1 − 1
)
ǫ2
n+ 1
≤
−n · ǫ2
n + 1
+ ǫ1 · ǫ2 + ǫ2
0 ≤ ǫ1 · ǫ2
Similar alulations shows that (4) also holds when m = ǫ1. We leave the
proof of the ase fw >
n
n+1
to the reader.
3.3.2 Routing under nOPS strategies on Pigou's graph
Now we show that for any partition π ∈ Π(N) that onsist of at least 3
oalition, we an set the delivery tasks in suh way that the nOPS strategies
do not onverge to the NE point in D(ΓP , N,∆, σ(A)). It is lear from
Theorem 3 that if π is xed then for every S ∈ π, the zero order strategy is
sS0 =
{
fSw =
∑
j∈S r
j if
∑
j∈S r
j < 1/2
fSw = 1/2 otherwise.
If the number of player and the delivery tasks are suh that λSw ≥ 1 for
every S ∈ π then FOPS of every oalition will be to route everything on
the upper edge. Then again the SOPS will be the same as the zero order
strategy and so on. Therefore nOPS does not neessarily onverge as n goes
to innity, even when there is a unique Nash-equilibrium point in a given D.
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3.4 Subadditivity
Intuitively one would expet that the delivery game is superadditive. When
a oalition is formed it gains extra information from the new members. The
sum λ̂Se + f
S
e that determines the lateny of the edge e seems to be more
ontrollable as S gets larger. However this impression turns out to be wrong.
We show two examples of the arising subadditive property for two dierent
strategies.
3.4.1 An example of subadditivity in the ase of zero order strat-
egy
In this example we demonstrate the subadditivity property on a symmetri
three player example assuming zero order strategy. In this three player ex-
ample the ooperation of any two players implies negative onsequenes for
them and a positive externality for the third player. The explanation for the
phenomena is that (assuming zero order strategy in this ase) the routing
orresponding to the expeted minimum ost result in a higher overall ost,
implied by the other players' ativity.
Let us onsider network 3 depited in Fig. 3. τ 1 = (2, a, t), τ 2 = (2, b, t)
and τ 3 = (2, c, t).
b
t
x2
x2
a
c
f
d
e x2
o
o
o
oo
o
Figure 3: The basi struture of the network 3.
Coalition struture {i},{j},{k}
Beause of the symmetry, eah player will route his delivery distributed
equally between the two available paths. This will result in 2 units of tra
on eah line, and a total ost of 8 of eah player.
Coalition struture {i,j},{k}
It is easy to see that the ooperating players will route their total delivery
distributed equally among the 3 pathways available for them The resulting
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routing eg. in the ase of the oalition struture {1, 2}, {3} will be as depited
in Fig. 4.
b
t
7/3
7/3
a
c
f
d
e 4/3
2/3
4/3
2/3
4/31
1 4/3
4/3
2/3
2/3
1
1
Figure 4: Routing in the ase of oalition struture {1,2},{3}
The resulting ost of the oalition {1, 2} will be c({1, 2}) = 16.88 whih is
0.88 units higher than their total ost in singleton onguration (v({i, j}) =
−0.88). The resulting ost of the third player will be c(3) = 2(1 + 2/3)2 =
5.556 whih implies v({k}) = 2.444
Grand oalition In the ase of the grand oalition, the resulting routing
and routing osts will be as the same as in the ase of singleton oalitions,
whih means that these two oalition ongurations are the stable partitions
of the game.
3.4.2 An Example of Subadditivity assuming Nash routing strat-
egy
Let us onsider three players with the same delivery task τ 1−3 = (1, s, t) on
the Pigou network. It follows from Theorem 3 that for oalition struture
π0 = {1}{2}{3} at the NE-point every player routes 1
4
amount of tra on
the lower edge. Therefore eah player has
3
4
· 1 + 1
4
· 3
4
= 0.9375 lateny ost.
For oalition strutures π = {i}{j, k} the Nash-equilibrium strategies are dif-
ferent as oalition {j, k} ats as one player. Therefore at the NE-point there
ows
2
3
tra on the lower edge. The ost of oalition {i} is 2
3
·1+ 1
3
· 2
3
= 0.88˙
while {j, k} has 5
3
· 1+ 1
3
· 2
3
= 1.88˙ ost. Note that players j and k are worse
o together than if they would route their tra individually, whih is an
example of subadditivity. If the grand oalition is formed then there goes
1
2
tra on the bottom road. The overall ost is
5
2
· 1 + 1
2
· 1
2
= 2.75. Table 4
summarizes the above omputation.
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partition (π) ost of players (c(j)) values of oalitions (v(S))
{i},{j},{k} 0.9375, 0.9375, 0.9375 0,0,0
{i,j},{k} 1.8888˙, 0.8888˙ -0.0138, 0.0487
{i,j,k} 2.75 0.0625
Table 4: Routing osts and oalitional values in the ase of the Pigou example
(network 2) assuming Nash routing.
3.5 Stability
To analyze stability and determine a harateristi funtion for a ertain
strategy we use the onept of the reursive ore (Kózy, 2007, 2009), that
allows the remaining, residual players to freely reat and form a ore-stable
partition before the payo of the deviating oalition is evaluated.
First we dene the residual game over the set R ( N . Π(N) denotes the
set of partitions of N . Assume R = N \ R have formed πR ∈ Π(R). Then
the residual game (R, Vpi
R
) is the PFF game over the player set R with the
partition funtion given by Vpi
R
(S, πR) = V (S, πR ∪ πR).
Denition 4 (Reursive ore Kózy (2007)) For a single-player game
the reursive ore is trivially dened. Now assume that the ore RC(N, V )
has been dened for all games with |N | < k players. For an |N |-player
game an outome (x, π) is dominated if there exists a oalition Q forming
partition π′ and an outome (y, π′∪πQ) ∈ Ω(N, V ), suh that yQ > xQ and if
RC(Q, Vpi′) 6= ∅ then (yQ, πQ) ∈ RC(Q, Vpi′). The (reursive) ore RC(N, V )
of (N, V ) is the set of undominated outomes.
Based on the onept of the Reursive Core, a minimal laim funtion
an be dened, whih desribes the minimal laim of eah oalition in the
orresponding PFF game redued to that oalition. This funtion, termed
vmc in the following, may be applied in the same spirit as a harateristi
funtion, sine it assigns a unique value to eah oalition, whih they an
seure for themselves if they deviated. The formal denition of vmc is as
follows.
Denition 5 Let us onsider the residual game (S¯, VpiS) over the player set
S dened by the partition funtion VS(R, πS) = V (R, πS∪S) where R ∈ πS ∈
Π(S). Let us denote the Reursive Core of the residual game by RC(S¯, VS).
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The (pessimisti) minimal laim funtion vmc an be dened as
vmc(S) =
{
min∑
i∈S x
i{Ω(N, V )|(x, P S) ∈ RC(S¯, VS)} if RC(S¯, VS) 6= ∅
min∑
i∈S x
i{Ω(N, V )} if RC(S¯, VS) = ∅
where vmc(S) is the minimal laim of oalition S.
With the help of the minimal laim funtion, a haraterization of the
Reursive Core an be given as follows.
Lemma 3.2 The Reursive Core RC(N, V ) of the game (N, V ) is a olle-
tion of Pareto eient outomes (x, π) ∈ Ω(N, V ), suh that there is no
oalition S with vmc(S) >
∑
i∈S x
i
.
3.5.1 The stability of example I
Aording to the onept of the reursive ore, the minimal laim funtions
regarding the strategies of various order an be determined. The minimal
laim funtions in the ase of zero order strategy and FOPS are summarized
in Table 5.
Coalition Value
{1} 0.75
{2} 0.1875
{3} -0.75
{1,2} 2.625
{1,3} 1.8437
{2,3} 7.125
{1,2,3} 12.375
Coalition Value
{1} -0.25
{2} 0
{3} -0.375
{1,2} 1.5
{1,3} 0
{2,3} 1.875
{1,2,3} 4
Table 5: Minimal laim funtions derived by the reursive ore method of
Example 1 in the ase of zero order strategy and FOPS
We an depit the evolution of the geometry of the reursive ore as the
order of the applied strategy inreases (see Fig. 5). Although the singleton
referene ase and so the oalitional values and payos are dierent in the
ase of eah strategy, it an be seen in Fig. 5, that as we inrease the order
of the applied strategy, the geometry of the reursive ore onverges to its
nal shape.
3.5.2 Emptiness of the reursive ore
In this subsetion we show two examples, where the reursive ore turns out
to be empty.
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Figure 5: The projetion of the reursive ore in the ase of various strategies
to the plane x3=0. The equation x3 = v({1, 2, 3})−x1−x2 holds in every ase.
Let us remember that the ost of the referene ase (all singleton oalitions)
aording to whih the values of the oalitions in dierent partitions are
determined is dierent in the ase of eah strategy - that is the reason why
the overall payo tends to derease.
Non-monotone edge lateny funtions In this setion we demonstrate
that the reursive ore may be empty if we assume a network with an edge
with non-monotone lateny funtion (depited in Fig.6), and routing tasks
δ1 = (1, a, t), δ2 = (1, b, t), δ3 = (1, c, t).
1
2
4
3
(X-2)2
1
(3)
1
0
0
0
0.5
0.5
0.5
1
5
(0)
1
2
4
3
(X-2)2
1
(3)
1
0
0
0
0.5
0.5
0.5
1
5
0.2949
0.7051
0.2949
0.7051
0.7051
0.2949
Figure 6: Example network with non-monotone edge lateny funtion and
resulting routing in the ase of the grand oalition.
Zero order strategy and the oalition struture {i},{j},{k} will result in a
symmetri onguration, in whih eah player will route his delivery on the
0.5 lateny edge. This results in a total ost of 0.5 of eah player.
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In ontrast, if we assume the oalition struture {i,j},{k}, then {i,j} will
route his tra on the (x − 2)2 edge at the ost of 0  v({i, j}) = 1, while
the third player is not aeted (v(k) = 0). In the ase of the grand oalition:
c({1, 2, 3}) = 0.4705  v({1, 2, 3}) = 1.0295. It is easy to see that this
results in the emptiness of the reursive ore.
Non-ontinuous edge lateny funtions Consider the following exam-
ple (see Fig.7)
2
where N = {1, 2, 3}, players follow zero-order strategy and
the delivery tasks are τ 1 = (1.4, a, t), τ 2 = (1.4, b, t) and τ 3 = (1.4, c, t).
Figure 7: Example network with non-ontinuous edge lateny funtion and
resulting routing in the ase of the grand oalition.
In the ase of singleton oalition eah player splits his tra into two
equal parts and sends them on the two possible routes to t. In this way eah
edge with non-zero lateny funtion has a lateny ost of 2 (as ⌈1.4⌉ = 2).
For partitions π = {i, j}{k}, player i and j route on the jointly used edge
1 amount of tra and send the rest on the other routes. As a result on
the other two edge the tra is inreased to 1.6 however this hange does
not aet the lateny ost of these two edge. Finally in the ase of grand
oalition it is not hard to see that the players an send only 1 amount of
tra with a lateny ost of 1 the rest has to be sent for a lateny ost of
2. Therefore the total ost is 7.4. Emptiness of the ore follows from the
fat that the ost saving of any two person oalition is the same as the ost
saving of the grand oalition (see Table 6).
4 Conlusions and future work
In this artile a new family of PFF form delivery games on routing networks
has been introdued. Various routing strategies have been analyzed, and it
2⌈x⌉ denotes the upper integer part of x.
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partition (π) ost of players (c(j)) values of oalitions (v(S))
{i},{j},{k} 2.8, 2.8, 2.8 0,0,0
{i,j},{k} 4.6, 2.8 1, 0
{i,j,k} 7.4 1
Table 6: Emptiness of the ore in a network with non-ontinuous edge lateny
funtion.
has been shown that the sequene of preditive strategies of inreasing order
may onverge to a NE routing onguration, but it an be also divergent.
We have shown on the widely known Pigou network that NE routing may
exists in suh games, where the nOPS is divergent. We provided examples
to subadditive senarios in various ases, and thus have proven that the
dened game is not neessary superadditive. Furthermore we analyzed the
stability of the game, and the evolution of the geometry of stable payo sets
via the reursive ore onept. In addition we have shown that assuming
non monotone or non ontinuous lateny funtions the reursive ore may be
empty.
One straightforward open question is whether the reursive ore may be
empty if we suppose ontinuous (stritly) monotone inreasing lateny fun-
tions. An other open problem is how to provide neessary and suient
onditions for the sequene of iterative strategies to onverge to a NE. We
hope that the approah of potential methods desribed in (Nisan, Roughgar-
den, Tardos, and Vazirani, 2007) may oer useful tools for the analysis of
this problem.
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Appendix A
In this appendix the detailed alulations regarding network 1 depited in
Fig. 1 assuming FOPS strategy an be found, to demonstrate the preditive
strategies.
Determination of routing paths aording to the zero or-
der strategy
Do determine the routing under FOPS strategy, rst we have to alulate the
resulting routing in the ase of zero order strategy. In the ase of singleton
oalitions, all players neglet the ativity of other players, and determine
their routing variables (x) aording to minimize
cexp(∆,pi)(S) =
∑
j∈S
(∑
e∈E
le(λ̂Se + f
S
e ) · f
j
e
)
.
assuming λ̂Se = 0 ∀ e ∀ S. In this ase resulting load and latenies of the
network will be as depited in Fig. 8, and listed in Table 2. The routing
variables x uniquely determine the edge ows fSe .
a
b
1
d
1
e
2
c
4.75
1
f
1
5.75a
b
2.75
d
2.75
e
1.5
c
4.75
6
f
1.5
5.75
1.5
1.25
0.25
2.5
6
3.5
3
Figure 8: Resulting routing loads, and edge latenies assuming zero order
strategy and singleton oalitions.
The resulting total delivery osts of the oalitions (whih are equal to
players in this ase) an be alulated as (in order to simplify the notations,
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we omit the lower index (∆,pi):
c(1) = (3 + (6− x1) + (3− x2 − x3))3
c(2) = (x1 + x3)x1 + 2(6 − x1) + (6− x1 + 3− x2 − x3 + 3)(6− x1) + 6
c(3) = (0.5 + x2)x2 + (3− x2) + 2(3− x2 − x3) + (x1 + x3)x3
+((3− x2 − x3) + (6− x1) + 3)(3 − x2 − x3) (5)
In the above ase the delivery osts will be as follows. c(1) = 17.25,
c(2) = 42, c(3) = 12.625, as listed in Table 3. As it an be seen, the zero
order planning strategy (not surprisingly) signiantly underestimates the
routing osts.
Other oalition strutures In the ase of other partitions, the alula-
tions are similar. Eah oalition optimizes the routing variables orrespond-
ing to the partiipating players, taking into aount the resulting load the
oalition puts on the network. The resulting routing variables and osts are
listed in tables 2 and 3.
Determination of routing paths aording to the rst or-
der preditive strategy (FOPS)
π = {1}, {2}, {3}
The route planning of player 1 is still trivial (his expeted ost is 8.25 in this
ase).
Player 2 will assume that player 1 and player 3 will route their delivery
aording to the zero order strategy. This will result in the minimization of
the value of c(2) (see Eq. 5) assuming [x2 x3] = [1.5 1.25] (c
exp({2}) =
c(2)|[x2 x3]=[1.5 1.25]) this implies x1 = 4.
Aording to the zero order routing of players 1 and 2, the expeted ost of
player 3 will be cexp(3) = c(3)|x1=3.5, whih is minimal at [x2 x3] = [2.5 0.5].
In this ase the delivery osts will be as follows. c({1}) = 15, c({2}) = 38,
and c({3}) = 10.25. As it an bee seen when ompared to the zero order
strategy, in the ase of singleton oalitions the FOPS in this ase has redued
the total ost of all players.
π = {1, 2},{3}
The expeted ost of the oalition {1, 2} is cexp({1, 2}) = c(1)+c(2)|[x2 x3]=[1.5 1.25]
whih is minimal at x1 = 4.75. The routing of player 3 will be as before. The
routing osts will be c(1) = 12.75, c(2) = 38.75 and c(3) = 10.625. Thus the
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benet of the ooperation for oalition {1, 2} is 1.5, while the value of player
3 is -0.375 in this partition.
π = {1, 3},{2}
In this ase, player 1 and player 3 an not improve their routing, the resulting
will be the same as in the singleton ase. The expeted ost of the oalition
{1, 3} is cexp({1, 3}) = c(1) + c(3)|x1=3.5 whih is minimal at [x2 x3] =
[2.5 0.5]. c({1}) = 15, c({2}) = 38, and c({3}) = 10.25.
π = {1},{2, 3}
The expeted ost of the oalition {2, 3} is cexp({2, 3}) = c(2)+ c(3) whih is
minimal at [x1 x2 x3] = [4.25 3 0]. c({1}) = 14.25, c({2}) = 35.875, and
c({3}) = 10.5. This implies a benet of 1.875 to the oalition {2, 3}.
π = {1, 2, 3} The resulting routing in the ase of the grand oalition is the
same as under zero order strategy. This implies here the benet of 4 for the
grand oalition.
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